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STOIC DEFENCE OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Floris Tomasini1 
Abstract: Rational suicide can be minimally defined as: instrumentally rational, autonomous, due to stable goals and not due 
to mental illness. One major problem with rational suicide is that it tends toward a technical psychiatric definition, excluding 
any philosophical explanation of why rational suicide could be ethically justified. In other words, there is a tendency towards an 
instrumental view of rationality which concentrates on safeguarding the rational means of suicide, rather than fully considering 
the rational ends of why suicide could be ethically justified in certain special and controlled circumstances. To begin, the 
plausibility of rational suicide is explored.  Following on, the classical stoic idea of rational ends of suicide is then reframed 
for a more contemporary audience in the socially relevant context of physician-assisted suicide. 
Key words: rational suicide, stoicism, self-preservation, physician-assisted suicide
Defensa estoica del suicidio asistido por el médico
Resumen: El suicidio racional puede definirse mínimamente como: racional instrumentalmente, autónomo, debido a metas 
estables y no a enfermedad mental. Un problema mayor con el suicidio racional es que tiende hacia una definición técnica 
psiquiátrica, excluyendo cualquiera explicación filosófica sobre su justificación ética. En otras palabras, existe una tendencia 
hacia una visión instrumental de la racionalidad, porque se concentra en salvaguardar los medios racionales de suicidio, más 
que en considerar plenamente los fines racionales de por qué el suicidio podría ser éticamente justificado en ciertas circuns-
tancias especiales y controladas. Para comenzar, se explora la posibilidad de suicidio racional. Luego, la idea estoica clásica de 
los fines racionales del suicidio es reformulada para una audiencia más contemporánea, en el contexto socialmente relevante 
de suicidio asistido por el médico.
Palabras clave: suicidio racional, estoicismo, auto preservación, suicidio asistido por el médico
Defesa estoica do suicídio assistido por médico
Resumo: Suicídio racional pode ser minimamente definido como: instrumentalmente racional, autônomo, causado por 
objetivos estáveis e não derivado de doença mental. Um importante problema com o suicídio racional é a sua tendência de 
uma definição técnica psiquiátrica, excluindo qualquer explicação filosófica do porquê que o suicídio racional poderia ser 
eticamente justificado. Em outras palavras, há uma tendência do ponto de vista instrumental de racionalidade que concentra 
sob salvaguardas os meios racionais de suicídio, em vez de considerar totalmente as finalidades racionais pelas quais o suicídio 
poderia ser eticamente justificado em certas circunstâncias, especiais e controladas. Para começar, a plausibilidade do suicídio 
racional é explorada. Em seguida, a clássica ideia estoica dos fins racionais do suicídio é, então reformulada para um público 
mais contemporâneo num contexto socialmente relevante do suicídio assistido por médico. 
Palavras-chave: suicídio racional, estoicismo, autopreservação, suicídio medicamente assistido
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Historical background
Our attitude and understanding of suicide has 
dramatically changed over time. Although it is 
unrealistic to chart a detailed history of suicide, it 
is possible to understand some of the broader shi-
fts in perspective that contest the rationality and 
morality of suicide. There are three broad cons-
tituencies of debate around suicide: theological, 
psychiatric and philosophical.
The prevailing view against suicide arises out of 
the theological constituency of debate and the 
idea that all life is sacrosanct. It has deep roots 
in Judeo-Christian theology and philosophy. 
In Aquinas’ view, for example, suicide is wrong 
because only God can take our lives away. Also, 
he believes the act of suicide is contrary to Na-
ture(1). Suicide is considered to be self-murder 
and a terrible sin that has deep historical roots. 
For example, Catholics still debate whether the 
soul of a suicide will be denied salvation in the 
after-life by being sent to purgatory. Furthermo-
re, the sin of suicide was considered to be heinous 
crime; since as recently as 1860 attempted suicide 
was punishable in England by death. From 1917 
to 1983, the church’s Canon Law said that ‘tho-
se who killed themselves of a deliberate purpose’ 
were to be deprived of ecclesiastical burial. This 
provision was dropped from the revised Code of 
Canon Law promulgated by Pope John Paul II 
in 1983, which is still the current norm. Howe-
ver, ‘grave psychological disturbances, anguish, or 
grave fear of hardship, suffering, or torture can 
diminish the responsibility of the one commit-
ting suicide’.
Overview of approach and method 
The contemporary debate over suicide has shifted 
away from theology to psychiatry and philosophy. 
The main objective of this paper is to defend ra-
tional suicide in the context of physician-assisted 
suicide. 
Before this is possible it is necessary to outline the 
methodology of the study undertaken and to pre-
view the logical sequence of the argument and re-
sults as it unfolds in the text. There are three parts 
to the argument, which characterise three distinc-
tive approaches or methods. The first part of the 
argument is largely a critical review of whether 
rational suicide is at all possible. Some commen-
tators have tended to criticise the plausibility of 
the notion of rational suicide on the grounds 
that it is: conceptually unintelligible; morally 
impermissible and; a sign of mental illness. The 
methodology behind the first third of the paper 
is to present a critical review of the negative case 
against the plausibility of rational suicide. The lo-
gical sequence of the negative case against rational 
suicide is based on a philosophical discussion and 
evaluation of the following questions:
(1) Is suicide intelligible (or conceptually ratio-
nal)?
(2) Is suicide ever a morally permissible act (or 
morally rational)?
(3) Can suicide be competently chosen (or men-
tally rational)?
 
Having dismissed a negative case against the plau-
sibility of rational suicide, a positive and more 
persuasive case is made for why rational suicide 
should be taken seriously in the modern context 
of physician-assisted suicide. In order to do this, 
the methodology reverts from critical analysis (of 
previous writers on the subject) to a more origi-
nal conceptual analysis of a classical stoic defen-
ce of rational suicide, which is then reframed as 
a neo-stoic perspective on physician-assisted sui-
cide. The logical sequence of this argument is as 
follows:
(4) Rational suicide from a classical stoic pers-
pective
(5) A neo-stoic perspective on rational suicide in 
the context of physician-assisted death
Finally to look at the plausibility of the positive 
case for rational suicide, the argument ends with 
a methodology that involves ‘empirical philoso-
phy’, that is an empirical assessment of the ratio-
nality of physician-assisted suicide in an institu-
tional setting (the discussion of two case studies 
at Dignitas). By way of conclusion, there is a short 
evaluation of the meaning and importance of the 
study as well the limitations and implications for 
future research. 
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That is,




Is rational suicide a plausible notion?
(1) Is rational suicide intelligible?
Suicide is taken from the Latin sui meaning of 
‘oneself ’ and cidium meaning to ‘slay or kill’. 
However, the very intelligibility of self-slaying is 
questionable without prior cause, since suicide is, 
generally, not chosen for its own sake. It is fairly 
unintelligible to ‘wish to be dead’ for no reason. 
Suicide is intelligible if it is understood as having 
an antecedent cause, often in respect to relief 
from certain kinds of physical pain or psycho-
logical anguish(2). Whereas, suicide, commonly 
understood – as a relief from physical pain and 
psychological anguish – may have an intelligible 
cause, it may still not be a rational act. Whilst 
the cause of someone committing suicide, from a 
third person perspective, may be intelligible, the 
act itself may seem insufficiently rational by virtue 
of the fact that it stems from mentally incompe-
tent decision-making. In other words, most sui-
cide attempts are made by people who are either, 
mentally ill or, are under enough mental duress, 
so as not to act in their best (long-term) interests. 
Devine presumes that there is no after-life and 
that we are annihilated by death. Because of our 
presumed annihilation, Devine argues that death 
is un-experiencable and therefore any outcome – 
the cessation of pain or psychological anguish, for 
example – is unexperiencable and unknowable. 
Furthermore, since it is Devine’s view that the 
precondition of a rational choice ‘is that one must 
know what one is choosing’(3), it is not rational 
to kill oneself unless one has full knowledge of 
what the alternatives are. 
Philip Devine’s argument is taken to task by 
Mayo(4). What follows is a short summary of 
Devine’s argument and Mayo’s criticisms of it. 
There are some serious problems with this view, 
according to Mayo. First, the presumption that 
death is annihilation and cannot be experienced 
is questionable. Some might refer to religious 
belief in the after-life or ‘near-death’ experiences 
to question the unexperiencable nature of death. 
Even if we grant Devine his presumption that 
death cannot be experienced it still seems suspect 
to equate the unexperiencable with the unknowa-
ble: following Mayo, ‘if we have a good reason to 
believe that death is annihilation, it is difficult to 
understand what more needs to be known about 
it before it can be said to be known’(4:151).
Finally, according to Mayo, Devine seems to be 
functioning with a form of ‘rational choice’ where 
one must have complete knowledge of alternati-
ves.  He is, therefore, operating with a standard of 
rationality that is difficult to attain in any prac-
tical sense. In everyday life we routinely operate 
on the basis of imperfect knowledge, rationally 
choosing between an unknown and a known evil. 
So, while it may not be rational to opt for death 
as an unknown for its own sake, it maybe rational 
to gamble on the uncertainty of death, when the 
outcome of suicide is to end a life that is experien-
ced as incontrovertibly hopeless. 
By way of a summary: first, the unexperiencable 
nature of death as an outcome of suicide does not 
rule out, tout court, its rational sense in a life ex-
perienced as hopeless. And second, while suicidal 
ideation is intelligible, it is, more often than not, 
carried out by mentally incompetent persons who 
are not acting in respect to their long-term values 
and interests. Therefore, the intelligibility of sui-
cide does not fully secure its rationality as either a 
morally acceptable act or, as competently chosen 
one. 
(2) Is suicide ever morally permissible?
Another fundamental issue concerns the moral 
permissibility of the suicidal act. Some argue that 
suicide is morally irrational because it violates a 
fundamental view that human life is sacrosanct. 
This view originates in a deontological perspective 
on morality which holds on to the idea of sanctity 
of life: human life is intrinsically and inherently 
valuable, our duty being to honour and preserve 
ourselves and others no matter what(2,5).
There are a number of difficulties with this kind 
of view. 
102 
Stoic defence of physician-assisted suicide - Floris Tomasini
First, the intrinsic value of a life is independent 
of extrinsic criteria on which the quality of a life 
may be judged e.g. health and happiness. Any 
life, therefore, is intrinsically valuable regardless 
of what kind of life it is and what sort of suffering 
is endured. Singer cited in the Stanford Encyclo-
paedia of Philosophy(5) argues that this view mis-
places the value of what it is to be living a life. For 
Singer, extrinsic criteria, like quality of life, are 
indicators of the value of a life lived. From this 
perspective, suicide may be morally permissible, 
if the quality of a life is chronically low and is 
likely to remain so in the future e.g. in the case of 
a terminal illness.
Second, it is perfectly possible to value the sancti-
ty of life and still commit suicide. Indeed, Dwor-
kin (1993) cited in Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy admits ‘that those who engage in sui-
cidal behaviour, when the future promises to be 
extraordinarily bleak, do not necessarily exhibit 
insufficient regard for the sanctity of life’(5:11).
Finally there are even some of those who accept 
‘the sanctity of life’ principle and agree that sui-
cide may affirm life’s value if the agent’s future 
prospects are bleak. For some of these commenta-
tors like Cholbi(2,6) it might be morally rational 
to reject a life that misses certain essential quali-
ties for a dignified human life. Cholbi’s goes some 
way to meet the stoic case for rational suicide that 
follows.  
In sum, it does seem that there is a morally ratio-
nal case for suicide, but only if the agents quality 
of life is particularly poor and hopeless. Crucia-
lly this cannot be secured unless suicide is acted 
upon by a mentally competent agent. 
(3) Can suicide be a mentally competent deci-
sion?
Suicide is the main cause of premature death 
amongst people with mental illness. It is estima-
ted that 10% of people with mental illness suicide 
within the first 10 years of receiving their diag-
nosis. Suicide is a more common cause of death 
among people with schizophrenia and mood di-
sorders such as bipolar disorder and depression, 
compared to the general population. People with 
personality disorders and disorders of addiction 
also have higher rates of suicide than the general 
population2. 
Mental illness significantly impairs rational choi-
ce. The way rationality is impaired depends lar-
gely on the nature of the mental illness suffered. 
So, according to Brandt(2) cited in the Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, a clinically depres-
sed person will have difficulty in projecting him-
self, beyond his present frame of mind, to take 
into account his values and preferences.  
Since there is a strong correlation between suicide 
and mental illness it is unsurprising that there are 
many contemporary critics arguing against the 
possibility of rational suicide. For example, many 
psychiatrists see suicide as inherently irrational 
because suicidal ideation is indicative of some 
underlying form of mental illness or disorder. 
Just because there is a strong correlation between 
suicide and mental illness does not mean that 
all suicidal behaviour can be explained away on 
the basis of people having mental illness. Indeed, 
some psychiatrists feel a need to distinguish bet-
ween those suicidal people who commit suicide 
because they are temporarily mentally incompe-
tent due to a disturbed state of mind, and a much 
smaller group of mentally competent people 
who commit rational suicide after a realistic ap-
praisal of their long-term situation. For example 
Mayo(4:147-149) reviews the approach of the 
psychiatrist Jerome Motto in this regard. Mayo’s 
argument about Motto’s approach is worth sum-
marising in respect of rational suicide as compe-
tently chosen suicide. 
As a practising psychiatrist, Motto’s chief concern 
is when it is and when it is not appropriate to in-
tervene to prevent suicide. For Motto the notion 
of rational or irrational suicide bites at the point 
of suicidal ideation in a clinical setting. Motto 
introduces two conditions for rational suicidal 
ideation. First, it must conform to rational be-
liefs about options and consequences of the deci-
sion to suicide. This screens out irrational suicide 
on the basis of unrealistic beliefs, for example, ‘I 
will never get over my feelings for the lover who 
rejected me’(4:147). Second, Motto addresses 
the notion of irrational suicide by screening out 
2 Suicide line. Available from: http://www.suicideline.org.au/
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decisions based on transitory desires, which run 
counter to a person’s more fundamental values. 
This deals with many suicidal desires we may im-
pulsively act on when life might not be going so 
well for us, forgetting that emotional pain is often 
transitory.
In sum, there are some subtleties of meaning that 
need to be established between mental incompe-
tence as allied to mental illness and mental in-
competence in respect to sound clinical decision-
making. That is, suicidal ideation is indicative of 
an underlying mental illness which, by definition 
is non-rational. However, there are some, like 
Motto, who believe that suicide maybe rational, 
if a patient’s decision is based on realistic beliefs 
and in accordance with their long-term values. 
Interestingly from this perspective, mental in-
competence may not be synonymous with mental 
illness, since the rationality of decision-making is 
more about good judgment, than any underlying 
mental health issue. 
(4) Rational suicide from a classical stoic perspec-
tive
Sellars argues that the foundation of stoic ethics 
lies in the desire or drive that human and non-hu-
man animals have for self-preservation (oikeiōsis)
(7). According to Sellars, the ends that contribute 
to preservation of non-rational animals are: wa-
ter, food, shelter, etc. For a rational adult human 
being, however, to survive as rational human ani-
mals and not merely as an animal per se, we need 
pursue those things that preserve our rationality 
as well as our body. In short, we need to preserve 
the rationality of our souls as well as the biology 
of our body’s(7:108). By way of an example, Se-
llars paraphrases Epictetus: 
‘If a tyrant threatened to kill a stoic, if the stoic 
did not agree to do certain things he found dee-
ply objectionable, then, in order to secure his self-
preservation, the stoic would have to stand up to 
the tyrant, even if it meant the loss of his own 
life’(7:109).
If one breaks down what rational self-preserva-
tion amounts to from a classical stoic perspective, 
it involves three key elements:
An unavoidable conflict: usually brought about by 
a tyrannical dictator who forced a stoic to sacrifi-
ce his values in exchange for his life. In terms of 
rational self-preservation, in order to preserve the 
virtue of one’s soul, it was sometimes necessary 
to die honourably by sacrificing one’s biological 
existence.
An intrinsic appreciation of intrinsic human ends 
over extrinsic needs: the virtuous soul is intrinsica-
lly essential to rational life in comparison to bare/
biological life (which supports but does not hold 
our virtue).
A maximal notion of the good life: classical stoic 
suicides tended to be honourable, if not heroic, 
attempting to preserve the perfectibility of a vir-
tuous existence.    
Having outlined the classical case for rational sui-
cide, it is necessary to see how such stoicism may 
be contextualised in a modern context.
(5) A neo-stoic perspective on rational suicide in 
the context of physician-assisted death
Mayo is a philosopher who has made connections 
between stoicism, rational suicide, mental com-
petence and voluntary euthanasia. Mayo begins 
by quoting Seneca: ‘…It is not of dying earlier 
or later, but of dying well or ill. And dying well 
means escape from the danger of living ill’(4:143). 
In doing so, he aligns himself to a general stoic 
position. That is, it is sometimes rational to com-
mit suicide for ‘good reasons’, ‘in keeping with 
the agent’s fundamental interests’(4). Mayo goes 
on to explore this in a more contemporary con-
text, reviewing the argument from more of a 
psychiatric, rather than philosophical, point of 
view. From psychiatry he argues that suicide can 
be rational if it is competently chosen; by that he 
means if it is a decision based on realistic beliefs 
aligned to one’s long-term values. He also makes 
the point that stoicism was at the heart of those 
early campaigners of the British Voluntary Eutha-
nasia Society who in 1969 were narrowly defeated 
in their attempt to legalise active voluntary eutha-
nasia(4:149). While Mayo’s paper is a thoughtful 
and excellent critical review of the concept of ra-
tional suicide from a number of different cons-
tituencies of debate, this paper looks at rational 
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suicide from a more in-depth philosophical and 
stoic point of view, within the narrower context 
of physician-assisted suicide. 
Before going on, it is important to distinguish 
rational suicide from regular suicide. In simple 
terms, regular suicide may be rationally intelli-
gible, but it is not a rationally competent deci-
sion based on an appreciation of intrinsic human 
ends. Rational suicide per se is not only compe-
tently chosen but also aligns to long-term values 
and interests that are in accord with a notion of a 
good life, even if, in the case of physician-assisted 
suicide this is understood in minimal rather than 
maximal sense.  
Interestingly the classical stoic perspective on ra-
tional suicide: (a) an unavoidable conflict (b) an 
intrinsic appreciation of human ends (c) a notion 
of the good life, repeat with a difference, in the 
more contemporary context of physician-assisted 
suicide. 
For example, the most compelling context for 
stoic (rational) suicide is in the case of terminal 
and/or chronic illness. Here a medicalised death 
can sometimes throw up an unavoidable conflict 
between prematurely ending a human life with 
dignity on the one hand and the technical capa-
city to prolong bare biological life on the other. 
In such cases, in order to affirm the preservation 
of our rational self, we may have to sacrifice our 
biological self prematurely.
Furthermore, a key difference between the clas-
sical stoic and modern stoic has to do with the 
‘form of life’(8) in which the preservation of long-
term values is understood. An ideal rational sui-
cide in the context of a medicalised death secures 
what is essential to a minimal rather than a maxi-
mal form of human flourishing. In other words, 
the neo-stoic attempt toward rational suicide may 
provide a context for a physician-assisted suici-
de where there is a desire to preserve a minimal 
sense of a good human life with recognizable and 
intrinsically valuable human ends. The minimal 
good of self-preservation is not the maximal no-
tion of the perfectibility of the rational soul (as 
in classical stoicism), but the self-preservation of 
a minimal good in terms of ‘care of the self ’. Mi-
nimal self-preservation of human flourishing can 
be thought of in terms of the ‘care of the self ’ 
rather than ‘care of the soul’ and, in the context 
of physician-assisted suicide, can be understood 
to be about preserving the intrinsic value of the 
autonomy, quality and the purposefulness of our 
humanity at the end of life. 
Having outlined how neo-stoicism may be used 
to justify the rational suicide of terminally ill pa-
tients, it is important to have some understan-
ding of the physician-assisted context, in which 
this can take place. 
Some commentators draw a distinction between 
active voluntary euthanasia and physician-assis-
ted suicide, arguing that the latter is an attempt 
to stop short at the physician ‘bringing- about the 
death of patient’. In this way professional agen-
cy is carefully restricted to a more passive role of 
safeguarding the rationality of suicidal ideation 
and the patient’s true self determination to follow 
through with the act of suicide. Rational suicide 
cannot simply be equated to physician-assisted 
suicide, unless the physician has carried out their 
duty of care to the patient; making sure that their 
choice to suicide, is at least mentally competent. 
Interestingly this is exemplified by the Swiss or-
ganisation Dignitas who are the only organisa-
tion that assist ‘suicide tourists’ in their desire for 
a rational suicide3. It is the client that: initiates 
the request for suicide; demonstrates their rational 
self-determination to responsibly carry through 
suicide without harm and interference from 
others and; activates and controls the means and 
timing of their own death. Nevertheless, there is 
much debate about whether Dignitas always se-
cures a ‘good death’ in terms of minimal notion 
of human flourishing. Physician-assisted suicide 
is just one form of rational suicide and cannot 
be assumed to be rational unless it really is freely 
chosen by a mentally competent patient who, in a 
sense, is ‘forced’ to choose a dignified human end 
in the face of a terminal illness that necessarily 
robs them of their dignity. To avoid a rogue or 
irrational physician-assisted suicide, the physician 
needs to make sure that the patient is making a 
voluntary and mentally competent choice to die. 
3 In The Guardian newspaper. Available at http://www.guardian.
co.uk/society/2009/nov/18/assisted-suicide-dignitas-house (Ac-
cessed 20th of march 2013).
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In addition medical doctors need to rely on an 
objective medical prognosis where there is clarity 
about the fact that minimal expectations of what 
constitutes the preservation of a good human life 
will definitely be outstripped by the course of di-
sease. 
Crucially if we are to have a thick and rich notion 
of rational suicide, we need more than just a set 
of technical reasons, why it is a good idea. The 
philosophers Pilpel and Amsel have recently cri-
ticised rational suicide on these grounds, arguing 
that technically rational suicides, can still be a 
‘bad mistake’. They argue that many proponents 
of rational suicide ‘out of a concern for autonomy 
and self-determination, are loath to claim that 
people’s choice of suicide is wrong unless there 
is something technically wrong with their reaso-
ning’(1: 111-123).
In short to have a robust view of rational suici-
de in the context of physician-assisted suicide we 
need a moral as well as technical rational. In other 
words, rational suicide is rational if it is: 
An instrumentally rational choice: where ratio-
nal self-preservation involves making a mentally 
competent choice based on their realistic beliefs 
and their long-term values.
An intrinsically rational choice: where a person ma-
king a decision to suicide has the moral insight to 
preserve a minimal notion of human flourishing 
in spite of the medical promise of life stripped to 
bare biological function. 
(6) Case studies in physician-assisted rational sui-
cide 
Having provided a theoretical outline of a stoic 
defence of rational suicide in the context of physi-
cian-assisted suicide, it is worth doing a little ‘em-
pirical philosophy’ to illustrate the plausibility of 
the case. 
Before illustrating some of what has been discus-
sed in neo-stoic terms, it is important to point 
out that rationally motivated physician-assisted 
suicide should never be morally obligatory. That 
is, we can only realistically expect medical profes-
sionals to offer their assent and assistance in our 
desire to die with dignity if they share some of 
our fundamental values on the intrinsic worth of 
a human life. This distinction can be illustrated 
through two case studies from the documentary 
‘The Suicide Tourist’4.
The first case study concerns a suicide pact.
George and Betty Coumbias entered into a sui-
cide pact when George’s health seriously deterio-
rated after he’d had three heart attacks. Because 
George’s life-time partner, Betty, could and would 
not live without her husband, they approached 
Dignitas in Switzerland to request assistance with 
a double suicide. What made the case particularly 
controversial (even for the most liberal interpreta-
tion of rational suicide) was that Betty Coumbias 
had no significant health problems. 
Neither Betty nor George had presented any 
obvious technical reasons why their request for 
physician-assisted suicide should be denied. They 
both entered into a stable and deliberate decision 
to end their lives (George and Betty had entered 
a suicide pact long before either one of them had 
become ill and now that George was gravely ill, 
Betty could not contemplate a life without him). 
They were not mentally ill (they might have 
been in a heavily co-dependent relationship, but 
neither were obviously mentally ill) and they had 
not neglected their responsibility to others (both 
their daughters had been informed and supported 
them in their decision). In short, some might ar-
gue that the couple’s choice may have been percei-
ved and defended as the best possible decision for 
them, given their particular circumstances. 
It is difficult, in the case of Betty, to shake off the 
intuition that she was throwing her life away for 
reasons that are not good enough.  
From the perspective of a physician, it is an 
anathema to assist in the suicide of a patient who 
is not in a hopeless medical condition. While 
George is gravely ill, Betty is perfectly healthy 
and therefore helping her commit suicide is an 
obvious affront to the Hippocratic Oath.  
Betty is not obviously mentally ill. However, her 
4 The Suicide Tourist. 2010, directed by Zaritsky, J., Canada: CTV 
Television.
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mental competence is doubtful given her deeply 
co-dependent relationship with her husband. In 
this sense, it might be argued, that her inability 
to even consider continuing her life without her 
husband at her side is not rational. Furthermore, 
it is unclear what the urgency for a suicide pact is 
when she would not have to give up the option 
of killing herself later on if she indeed found life 
without her husband to be unbearable. 
The clinical decision-making in this case is highly 
contestable; that is, while Betty Coumbias was 
not obviously mentally ill she still may have 
been mentally incompetent. As argued elsewhe-
re, mental illness and mental incompetence are 
not necessarily synonymous. In Betty’s case the 
fact that she wasn’t mentally ill did not necessarily 
guarantee her mental competence. 
It is interesting that the director of Dignitas, 
Ludwig Manelli, initially supported the couple’s 
request for consideration of physician-assisted 
suicide – even though the request was finally tur-
ned down by the attending physician, who under 
pressure from the Swiss authorities, refused to 
give his consent. Manelli’s justification was that 
‘it (suicide) should always be the decision of the 
individual’, providing there is no obvious techni-
cal reason for the request to be denied.  
Manelli’s point of view is based on the thin ac-
count of what is a technically justifiable idea of 
a good death. This leads to disturbing libertarian 
relativism. That is, there is little point in medi-
cal professionals acting as gatekeepers, preventing 
non-rational assisted suicides, if rational suicide 
is merely permission to assist those technically 
sane individuals who can weigh up the pros and 
cons of continued life, and then decide in favour 
of death. This leaves the door open for suicide 
on demand; a possible choice for anyone who is 
autonomous, without a mental illness and reaso-
nably responsible, but perceives, for one specious 
reason or another, their life turning out badly. 
From a psychiatrist like Jerome Motto’s point of 
view, it is unlikely that Betty’s decision to enter 
into a suicide pact with her husband George was 
competent. Motto provides a thicker and richer 
account as to what constitutes a clinically good 
reason to entertain rational suicide. From his 
point of view, it might be argued that Betty’s in-
competence arose from the fact that she could not 
even entertain the possibility that she might be 
able to create a meaningful life in the absence of 
her husband, or that she would not be giving up 
the option of killing herself later on. 
Concentrating on instrumental technical reasons 
alone for justification of rational suicide is, in 
the author’s view, insufficient explanation as to 
why rational suicide may or may not be a good 
idea. So, even if we follow the more responsible 
psychiatrist, Motto (whose position gives a reason 
to suggest why Betty Coumbias may not be men-
tally competent for physician-assisted suicide), it 
still begs certain fundamental philosophical ques-
tions as to why Betty killing herself would be bad 
mistake. 
Betty’s intransigence at not being able to imagine 
a meaningful or happy life without her husband 
is a mentally incompetent decision. However, 
that mental incompetence stems from her failure 
to recognise the intrinsic value of her life. That 
is, Betty’s suicide would not have preserved the 
intrinsic worth of a life thrown into stark relief by 
an unavoidable conflict between a minimally wor-
thwhile human flourishing on the one hand and 
bare biological life on the other. Betty does not 
have a terminal illness, she is relatively healthy. 
Moreover her life is not psychologically hopeless; 
she may still live a meaningful and happy life after 
her husband dies, alone or with someone else. In 
sum, her suicide would not have been rational in 
a more philosophically stoic sense. 
The second case concerns a person with a termi-
nal illness.  
This case followed Craig Ewart a 59 year old retired 
professor who approached Dignitas for an assisted 
suicide. He had a terminal disease called Amyo-
trophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS is a form of Motor 
Neuron Disease). ALS attacks nerves and muscles so 
that sufferers progressively lose function: the ability 
to stand, walk, get in and out of bed on their own, 
use hands and arms and eventually breathe (unassis-
ted) and communicate. 
Ewart’s request for assisted suicide was approved 
by Dignitas. He ended his life by determining the 
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place and time of his death in Switzerland and 
voluntarily accepting a liquid sedative (before he 
lost the ability to swallow) that would end his life 
after he disconnected himself from his artificial 
breathing apparatus. Craig’s choice was instru-
mentally rational in all the usual senses: it was 
stable and considered choice (Craig had made 
the choice, with the help of his wife and family, 
well before ALS became acute); it was a compe-
tent choice (Craig’s mental health was good, he 
was still enjoying life and not depressed); it was 
responsible to others (he had taken into account 
how his illness was impacting on his family and 
discussed that he and they would be better off 
if he committed suicide); it was the best choice 
given his circumstances (ALS is progressive ter-
minal disease, where there is no guarantee of not 
suffering).
In his own words: 
“Most statements that you read about the disea-
se are most people have a peaceful death. That’s 
fine for most people, but what if I am the one 
that doesn’t have a peaceful death? What might be 
peaceful from the outside does not necessarily re-
flect the internal state of that person. Let’s face it 
when you are completely paralysed you can’t talk, 
you can’t move your arms, your eyes, anything, 
how do you let somebody know you are suffe-
ring? ... At this point I’ve got two choices. Either 
I go with it or I say you know what I’m too scared 
right now I don’t want to do it. If I go with it, I 
die, as I know I must soon die, at some point. If I 
don’t go through with it my choice is to essentia-
lly suffer and to inflict suffering on my family and 
then die, possibly, in a way that is considerably 
more stressful and painful than this way. I’ve got 
death and I’ve got death with suffering”5.
Craig’s choice is not only instrumentally rational 
in all the usual senses, it is also substantively ratio-
nal. It is substantively (or philosophically) ratio-
nal because he recognises the ‘unavoidable con-
flict’ between the distinct possibility of ‘death and 
death with suffering’6. Moreover, there are some 
terminal diseases, like ALS, where our animality 
outstrips our capacity to preserve what we value 
5 Ibid., transcription of Greg Ewart.
6 Ibid., Greg Ewart.
about living life as a human being. When Craig 
was diagnosed with ALS and started to contem-
plate suicide he recognised the tension between 
human life and bare life: ‘you can only watch so 
much of yourself drain away and say, at some 
point, this is an empty shell’7. Therefore, for the 
sake of preserving his humanity, it makes sense, 
in this more substantive stoic sense, for Craig 
to have seriously contemplated ending his life 
prematurely. Finally there is evidence that Craig 
understood and appreciated joy, which was es-
sentially about life despite the progression of the 
disease: ‘I still enjoy living enough that I’d like to 
continue. But the thing is I really can’t, I am not 
tired of living I am tired of the disease’8. Craig, 
right up until his very end, still appreciated the 
intrinsic goodness of his life as a human being but 
realised that there was no way of preserving this 
without, ironically, committing suicide and put-
ting a stop to a disease that was robbing him of 
his humanity. His happiness had to do with the 
appreciation of his human capacity to still enjoy 
life while he could. Likewise his fear of suffering 
had to do with a fundamental fear that this could 
no longer be humanly communicated, unders-
tood and, therefore relieved. 
(7) Conclusion
Having made a special case for rational as oppo-
sed to regular or irrational suicide, it has been ar-
gued that rational suicide is particularly relevant 
when considering physician-assisted suicide. In 
arguing for the connection between the two there 
has been attempt to offer a stoic defence of ra-
tional suicide. In doing so, it is argued that for 
physician-assisted suicide to be fully rational it 
must preserve both competent decision-making 
to rational suicide as well safeguarding a shared 
sense of the intrinsic value of what makes human 
beings ‘human’ at the end of life. 
The originality and importance of the paper lies 
in the fulsome nature of the neo-stoic defence 
of rational suicide in physician-assisted death. 
Whilst Mayo is the first to make the connection, 
this paper makes clear the classical stoical roots of 
this argument and how it maybe reframed in the 
7 Ibid., Greg Ewart.
8 Ibid., Greg Ewart.
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context of physician-assisted suicide.
This said there are limitations to the results of 
this study. That is, whilst it is perfectly possible 
to present a cohesive and persuasive philosophical 
argument for physician-assisted rational suicide, 
it is quite another matter to safely secure ratio-
nal suicide in an institutionally robust setting.  As 
previously argued, Dignitas does not always ins-
pire confidence in securing the neo-stoic ideal of 
rational suicide (as evidenced by Coumbias case). 
As such, the implications for future research are 
more practical than philosophical: one might, 
for example, study how to secure rationally phy-
sician-assisted suicide in a robust institutional 
setting or, one could look into devising a robust 
legal framework. 
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